Photonic stability
Characterization, estimation and drift compensation in integrated photonic circuits, with open evidence and citable software.
Quantum communication and computing depend on finely controlled physical processes. Optical drift, temporal-mode distortion, parameter deviations and unauthorized configuration changes alter the behaviour and reliability of quantum hardware. AGE is investigating a software layer that watches over that physical integrity, extending its photonic characterization, estimation and compensation towards operational security.
Quantum Security does not create a new identity: it reuses the characterization, estimation and verification engine AGE already builds and points it at the physical integrity of quantum systems.
Characterization, estimation and drift compensation in integrated photonic circuits, with open evidence and citable software.
Minimum-norm receivers, control realizability and temporal-mode dynamics, with manuscripts and numerical benches.
Operational integrity, anomaly detection and physical monitoring of quantum systems, published as R&D and not as a validated product.
A QKD link can execute the mathematical protocol correctly and still present vulnerabilities in sources, detectors, optics or control electronics. The ETSI and ISO/IEC frameworks treat optical component characterization, implementation evaluation and security testing as part of the life cycle of a QKD system.
The connection with current AGE research is direct: when the temporal profile of the emitted photon changes, the receiver response changes with it — detection efficiency, selectivity, quantum bit error rate (QBER) and link stability. AGE’s minimum-norm receiver and physical realizability tools provide a framework for studying that effect.
A future application of the line is a module dedicated to monitoring the physical integrity of the optical channels of QKD systems.
An optical anomaly is not an attack. It can be an environmental disturbance, a component failure or deliberate tampering. AGE detects deviations and provides information to investigate their origin; attributing an attack requires an explicit threat model, reproducible attacks and measurable false-positive rates.
| Observable problem | AGE contribution |
|---|---|
| Thermal drift of components | Deviation detection and estimation |
| Optical parameter alteration | Parameter integrity monitoring |
| Temporal-mode distortion | Receiver selectivity diagnostics |
| Transmitter–receiver mismatch | Temporal compatibility assessment |
| Anomalous channel changes | Unexpected behaviour detection |
| Detector degradation | Parameter and response monitoring |
Optical phases, intensities, modulation parameters, emission timing, couplings and calibration configurations must stay within their margins. An uncontrolled disturbance — not necessarily an attack — is enough to alter the computational behaviour of a photonic circuit.
Check that the parameters observed during execution stay within the defined margins.
Identify deviations from the expected behaviour of a validated circuit.
Verify that calibration and compensation settings correspond to an authorized configuration.
Compare the observed behaviour against a reproducible reference to identify unexpected modifications.
Detecting a deviation does not imply malicious manipulation. Claiming attack detection requires threat models, reproducible attack campaigns and documented false-positive and false-negative rates.
The conceptual architecture connects photonic hardware with a security and reliability report through telemetry, characterization and an integrity engine covering drift detection, anomalies, integrity verification and temporal analysis.
Circuits, emitters, receivers and detectors.
Phases, intensities, timing, temperatures and monitoring signals.
Drift detection, anomalies, parameter integrity and temporal-mode analysis.
Deviations, uncertainty, alerts and traceability.
This separation between correcting and watching is the core differentiator of the line: in a security context, silent automatic correction is a liability, not a feature.
AGE does not develop new cryptographic algorithms. The line studies how to incorporate standardized signatures and authentication — such as ML-DSA (FIPS 204) — into the software infrastructure and its records.
Every proposed capability is evaluated against explicit threat models, measurable detection criteria and reproducible experiments. The roadmap prioritizes independent validation, documented limitations and transparent reporting.
Introduce controlled phase and intensity perturbations and check whether the bench spots deviations from expected behaviour.
Alter the temporal mode between transmitter and receiver on the 30 m link and study its effect on selectivity and detection.
In long records, separate normal environmental drift from deviations that require investigation.
Modeling of link parameters, source and receiver anomalies and QBER variations, with published attack scenarios clearly separated from benign perturbations.
Use the current code to watch for deviations, drift and physical anomalies. Goal: separate normal behaviour from unexpected disturbances.
Adapt temporal-mode and receiver models to QKD scenarios. Goal: assess how specific perturbations affect the system response.
Calibration, configuration and circuit behaviour verification. Goal: traceability and deviation detection.
Post-quantum signatures, release authentication and record protection. Goal: harden the integrity of the AGE software itself.
External evaluation with labs and security specialists. Goal: validate the capabilities against threat models and reproducible attacks.
The line is published as research and development, not as a validated commercial product. We are looking to collaborate with QKD groups, implementation-security specialists, photonics labs, detector manufacturers and quantum infrastructure companies.